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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONA L ..JOHNSON, on Behalf of
Herself and All Other Taxpayers of
the State of Utah,
Pl a int £ff, R esponrlent
and Cross-Appellant,
-vs.-

Case
No.10555

STATE TAX COMl\HSSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant

STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE
This is an action under Title 78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated, in which the plaintiff, respondent and crossappellant in the District Court of Salt Lake County
prayed for relief as follows :
1. That the income tax return filed by the plain1iff, as well as all other citizens of the State of Utah, prior
to .T a11uar.Y l, 1966, or any extension thereof, co ye ring
in<·ome earned during 1965, are properly filecl.
1

2. rrhat the applicable ineome blX rate• 011 said ineome tax returns filed prior to .January 1, 1966, or auy
extension thereof, is the rate applicable prior to the ('llactment of H. B. -81, passed by the ~6th Legislature.
3. That fiiscal year income taxpayers filing income
tax returns for a period ending during 1965, non-resident
income taxpayers filing for a period ending during 1965,
and the estates of deceased persons filing income tax re~urns during the calendar year 1965 and based upon
income tax rates applicable prior to the enactment of
H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) are proper and valid income tax filings.
4. That H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) is unconstitutional and unenforceable under the Utah and Federal
Constitutions because the application of the income tax
rates set forth therein are not equally and unformly
applicable to all Utah citizens of the same class.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
LOWER COURT
The lower court granted plaintiff, respondent, and
cross-appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
following terms :

1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact
alleged in the Complaint.
2. That the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81
(3Gth Legislature) do not apply to the plaintiff, D01w
2

L. .Johnson, Hor to other Utah iueomc taxpayers who
filrd i11<·omp tnx return:-; 011 or lwfon• De<·r·mhc1· 31, 10G0.

3. Section 5 of H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) is not
ambiguous and H. B. -81, as ·well as the statutes implementing said H. B. -81 do not violate provisions of the
Ptah or Federal Constitutions.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to confirm the lower conrt 's judgment:
"That the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81
( 36th Legislature) do not apply to the plaintiff,
Dona L ..Johnson, nor to other Utah income taxpayers who filed an income tax return on or before
December :n, 1965."
And:
"That Section 5 of H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature)
is not ambiguous .... ''
Plaintiff seeks to overrule the following portion of
the .Judgment of the lower court:
" ... H. B. -81, as well as the statutes implementing said H. B. -81 do not violate provisions of the
Utah or Fed0ra] Constitutions."
STATE"MENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah and
was rlomiciled in Utah during the entire year of 1965.
Nhe is a calendar year taxpayer who earned al1 of her
3

mcome in the State of 1T tah 11uring the year J 963. Her
income is, therefore, taxable by the State of Utah.
'1 he 36th Utah Legislature, on the 11 day of March,
1965, passed an individual income tax law known as
1

H. B. -81.
Section 5 of said H. B. -81 is quoted, as follows:
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to
all tax returns filed on or after ,January 1, 1966
for taxable years commencing on or after.January
1, 1965. ''
Accordingly, plaintiff and approximately 6,000 other
citizens of Utah filed 1965 calendar year income tax returns with the defendant Tax Commission, using the
income tax rates in effect prior to the enactment of
H B. -81.
An undisclosed number of estates, non-residents an<l
persons filing on the basis of a fiscal year, filed tax returns during the year 1965 at the tax rates in effect prior
to the enactment of H. B. -81.
The defendant, Tax Commission, has declared that
the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81, notwithstanding Section 5 thereof, are applicable only to citizens
who report their 1965 earnings on a calendar year basis.
Other Utah citizens who report their earnings on a fiscal
year basis, or who move from the State of Utah, or who
die during 1965 need not file under the rates provided in
H.B. -81.
4

1

AR GU l\LFJ NT
POINT I.
THF, 1963 UT AH LEG ISLA rrURE INTENDED
THAT THE INrOME TAX RATE INCREASE
DTPOSED BY H. B. -81 SHOULD NOT APPLY
EQUALLY rro ALL TAXPAYERS, AND
SECrt1 ION fi OF H. B. -81 WAS INTENTIORALLY DRAFTED TO PERMIT L~1\ CK OF UNIFORMITY AND TO AUTHORIZE EARLY
FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS TO
AVOID PAYMENT OF THE NE"W HIGHER
INCOME TAX RArrES IMPOSED BY H. B. 81.
Section 5 of H. B. -81 is quoted, as follows:
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to
all returns filed on or after .January l, 1966, for
taxable years commencing on or after .January 1,
1965.''
H. B. -81, including Section 5, was drafted through
tlH' joint efforts of attorneys and administratiYe offic0rs
asRigned to the Governor's Office and the defendant,
Tax Commission. The Bill was presented to the Committee on Revenue and Taxation of the House of Representatives by Utah's Director of Finance, who is an
attorney and who has a past record of service as a Commissioner with the defendant, Tax Commission. The
Bill was not drawn by members of the Legislature.
Defendant Tax Commission quarrels with the derision of the lower court which permits taxpayers to file
their jncome tax returns at the lower rates provided they
file prior to January 1, 1966. Yet the intended wording
5

of 8ed ion 3 of H. B. -81 and for which the def en<lant
'l1 ax Commission had deep concern was purposely drawn
to permit fiscal year taxpayers, <lead taxpayers and nonresident taxpayers to file at the rates in effect prior to the
passage of H. B. 81. The wording of this section vrns deliberate and intentional to avoid the administrative burden of accounting and auditing of prorated tax returns
during the transitional period of going from the lower
income tax rates to the higher income tax rates providecl
in H. B. -81. .Administrative exprdiencr and c011\'e11ie11er
offers little, if any, justification for the disparity and
lack of uniformity imposed upon income taxpa_'l"ers who
are required to pay the increased tax assessecl. :Moreover, it would be virtually impossible to advance a more
incon~istent position then to argue that one group of taxpayers in the same class should be permitted to pay income tax at a lower rate than other income taxpayers in
the same class in order to justify the administratiYc
expediency.

1

In support of the position that all 1965 calendar year
taxpayers must file at the new tax rates, defendant Tax
Commission cites the case of llf echwm, et al. v. State Tax
Com11iission, No. 10410, just decided by this court. At
Page 15 of the Record on Appeal in that case, the defendant Commission clearly states:
"It should be noted that the Bill does not req1tirr
returns filed in 1965 to be sub.feet to the increased
rates, but only refitrns filed on or after J arn1wry 1,
1966." (Emphasis added)

6

Arnl again in its brief, at Page 5, the defendant Tax
Commission urg<Yl this Court in remlering its decision:
"It should be noted that the Bill does not require
returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased
rates, but only returns filed on or after .January 1,
1966, which is after the effective date of the Bill.''

Tl1e defendant Tax Commission not only reviewed
H B. -81 prior to submitting it to the Legislature, but
the defendant Tax Commission also edited and appro-H'<-1
the wording of Section 5 in order to preserve the tax
inequity of the fiscal and short term taxpayer.
In a companion revenue bill increasing the corporate
fra11chise tax hy 50 per C('nt, the defendant Tax Commission approved a less complex ('ffectiYe datr clanse.
Section 6 of that statute, which was also enacted by the
1965 Legislature (H. B. -68), reads:
"This A ct shall take effect for all taxable years
beg-inning after December 31, 1964.''
OltYiously, the more complex effective date clause (Section 5 of H. B. -81) was for the clear purpose of all°'ving
disproportionate and unequal income tax filings.
In its rationale to overrule the clear meaning of Section 5 of H. B. -81. def encl.ant Tax Commission refers
to 59-14-1, Utah Code Annotated, defining taxable year.
This statute, read carefully, gives no comfort to defonoant 's position, since clearly there is no reference
therein to income tax rates and the statute obviously
1ras a<1opted merely to distinguish fiscal and fractional
fili11gs from calendar year filings.
7

Sutherland, in his work on statutory construction,

discusses uniformity and equality in the imposition of the
tax burden. He states:
"\Vhile the power to tax and the exercise of that
power is indispensable to the effective operntio11
of government, the rule has been fiirmly established that tax laws are to be strictly construe()
against the State and in favor of th.e taxpayer.
Therefore, where there is reasonable doubt as to
the meaning of a revenue statute, it should be resolved in favor of those taxed. It was stated in
Gould v. Gould, one of the leading cases upon the
subject:
'In the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes, it is the established rule not to extend
their provisions by implication, beyond the
clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of
doubt, they are construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the
citizen.'
"A number of theories have been put forth in sustaining the soundness of the doctrine. It has been
suggested that since all taxation must originate
through Legislation, precedent is lacking for extending its operation; that tax laws are not founded on a permanent public policy and, therefore,
should not be extended by implication; that /\
rigid application of revenue measures is for the
protection of the citizen who should be informed
in unambiguous terms the amount and nature of
his duty to pay taxes; and, that ~where tax statutes
impose burdens upon long established trades and
occupation, the balance of economic interest f ~wors
the taxpayer and not the State. Probably the l;esf
8

CXJJlanation frn t71r rule is to l;e tmnul h1 flu

tl1ron1 of ser11ri11.r; equality and uniformity in
thr 1:mposition of the tar l)/{rdrn." Sntlicrla1)(1, l>P
20:1, 294 11m1 29;)_ (Emphasis ad<lef1)

"EmzJhasis l!clon,qs upon t71r ,r;encral ol;Jrtfi,.es of
s11tli la11"s 1l'ifh a rieu· to G('('011IJJlisl1i11q 1111ifon11it.;1
and eq11aJit11 rrm 011 q t 71 e rla ss of JJCrson.~ so 11.r; 7d to
lJe ta.rrd." Suthf'rland, p. 297. (Emp1rnsis ac1(1ec1)

POINT II.
TNCOI\fE TAX RE'l1URNS FIL~JD PRIOR rro
.JANUARY 1, 19G6 MAY BE FTLED ~\TT.AX
RATES IN EFFECT PRIOR TO THF. ENAC'TI\lENT OF H. B. -81.
The ::l6th Legislature of tho Stnto of Utnh 01rncte<1
Honse Bi11 No. 81 to increase income tax rates on indil'i<1nal income.

Section 1 of House Bin No. SJ amcnc1oc1

R<'ctio11 G9-J4-2, Utah Code Annotato(l, 1953, hy increas-

irnr the n1tc of hx imposccl on net taxahle income.
tion G of the Act provides:

Sec-

''The tax rates provided for herein s11a1l apply to
all returns fi1cc1 on or after .fanuanT 1, 1966, for
taxahle years commencing on or after .Tannary 1,
1965."
11 l1iN cwdimt is the oprrntive srdion of the Act, Rpecih'i11g
to ·what tax rctnrns the rates provic1ec1 for in Sections

ii0-J4-2. Utah C'oclf' A1111otatec1, 1053, will he a1)p1icahle.
The plain mraning- of this pr0Yisi011 makrs it manifest
tl1:it ~hr inert>asl'd tax rates only appl~· to returns filed
(ill

or aftrr .Jnmrnry J, 1066.

rrhe lower court, in this case, as well as the case of
Mecham., ct af. v. State Tax Com mission, has ruled the
above Section 5 of the statute to be not ambiguous:
"Even when a court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not
expressed by the the phaseology of the Act, it will
not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain
meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.'' See Sutherland on Statutory Construction, page 314.

It is a well-established axiom of statutory construction, that a statute will be given the plain meaning that
arises from its reading.
In Ringuwod v. State, 8 U. 2d 287, 333 P. 2d 94:-5,
the Utah Supreme Court stated that a statute is normally
to be interpreted according to the ordinary and usual
meaning of the language used. The reason for the rule
of construction is manifest. The easiest means by which
a citizen has of determining what the law is is to read the
statute. Subtle distinctions that the Legislature might
have intended, cannot prevail over the plain meaning of
the statute to the contrary.
In People ex rel. Wood v. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 36 Pac.
404, it is stated:
"When the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there can
be no question as to its meaning, there is no room
for construction.''
No other meaning can be drawn from the provisions of
Section 5, Chapter 125, Laws of Utah 1965, exrept that
10

the substantive tax rates made applicable hy the legislation were to be oprrative only to returns filed after Jannary 1, 1966. In<leed, on page 5 of the Utah State rrax
Commission's brief, it is acknowledged that one of the
alternatives the Legislature might have had in passing
the ~mbject legislation would be '' ... that the rate increase shall only apply to returns filed after a certain
timr.'' This is exactly \Vhat the Legislature did. And
again at page 15 of the Record on appeal in M eclwm et al,
Y. State Tax Commission the defendant, Tax Commission, states: "It should he noted that the hill does not
require returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased
rates hut only returns filed on or after January 1, 1966."
It is a further well-stahlislwd axiom of statutory
construction that effect will he given to every word in a
statute, since it will he presumed that the Legislature did
not intend that a word be used in a statute without it
having some sie;nificance. Sutherland, Statritory Construction, ·3rd Ed., Sec. 4705. Sutherland, op. cit.,
observes:

"It is an elementary rule of construction that
effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute.' A statute sho111d
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will he inoperativr or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one
section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error."
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the vali(lity of this axiom of statutory construction in State v.
Oates, 118 Utah 182, 221 P. 2d 878. If the Legislature did
11

not intend a dirfon,nt rate to appl:- to r0m·ns filpc1 prior
to .Janrnny 1, J 0GG, "\Yhy was legislation usP<1 to th<• effpd
that the rates y,·ould he applicnlilc only to returns filed
afiC'r .T mrnary l, 19G6.

H may be that some members of the Legislature•
had in mind something other than that expressec1 in the
sfatute they passed, but as the Utah Supreme Court has
noted, this giYes no basis to change the plain meaning
of the statute.
A case where the Utah Supreme Court was faced

with a very similar argument was Park and Rer:reatin11
Commission v. Departmrnt of Fi11a11r:e, 15 U. 2d 110, 388
P. 2d 233. In that case, the 1961 Legislature appropriatc'd
a sum of money in excess of $1,000,000.00 to the Park arn1
Recreation Commission for the pnrchase of lands for
a state park. Subsequently, the Park and Recreation
Commission felt an additional sum of money "\Yas necessary and was or the opinion that $150,000.00 more 1rns
required. ,\n amendment in 1963 to the preYious appropriaticn was macle and the snm of $180,000.00 \ms 1111
thnt 1Yas specified in tlw act. It was argued that thr
cl0ar intention of the Legislature was to add the $150,000.00 to the previous sum appropriated. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that that might h:we been
the intention of the Legislature, hut that since the langnage used was c1rar, that -would go1Tern. The court ohserYrd:
'',\s to th0 J9G:i ad it S('C'rns nlrnost olffious tl1;tl
the legislature did not intern] to rmmw11lnt0 tlll'

12

authOl'ity of tho FJ61 art to irnrclrn:-;o land for o-\·er
a million <1ol1m· aggregate purehase prier, aml it
seems also almost ohvions that it irnlulged error,
in failing to note Ornt the 1963 amount \ms mrant
to be an aclditiou. The legislature has the prerogati,-e of making mistnkes, arnl it is not the jn(liciary to correct them if tlw language of the legislation is clear and unamhignous. The 1063 act
certainly is elear and mrnmhignons, and it is for
the legislature, not us, to rectify the latter's mistake, if there he one here .... ''
If however, the argument of the Utah State Tax Commission is coned, that the provision establishing the filing elate for the tax rrturns demonstrates an intention

to appl:- the increased rates to a11 calendar year returns
for the year 1965, then it is obvious that Section 5 of
Clwpter 125, Laws of Utah, 1965, is ambiguous, since this
section crrates a different inference. This being so, the
nmbignity must he resolYed in favor of the taxpayer.
Jfoss v. Boaril of Commissioners of Salt Lake rity, 1 U.
2nd 60, 261 P. 2d 961; Nonille Y. State Tax Commission,
~)8 Utah 170, 97 P. 2cl 9:17; TV. F. .Jrnse11 Candy Com7wny
\'. 8tate Tax Commission, 90 Utah 395, 61 P. 2d 629.
The Utah State Tax Commission has acknowledged
the ahove mentione<1 principle that ambiguity must be
reso1Yec1 in favor of tlw taxpa~·er.
POINT III
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL)
H. B. -81 (36th Legislaturr) IS UNCONSTITUTION L\ L BliJ('A TTSE IT PERMITS DIS CRIMI13

NATORY AND UNEQUAL APPLICATION OF
INCOME TAX RATES AMONG U'I1AH CITIZENS OF THE SAME CLASS.
Point throe of the appellant's brief appears to concede that calendar year taxpayers are affected differently
hy the provisions of H. B. 81 than are fiscal year taxpayers, but argn:~ that this does not make any difference
to the validity of the act.
Although Utah does not have a specific constitutional
provision relating to uniformity in the application of
i11come tax legislation, it does have a general provision,
Article I, Section 24, that, "all laws of a general nature
shall have uniform application." The absence of a specific provision relating to income tax uniformity appears
to make little difference. Federal courts, and state conrts
applying federal law, have long held that ineome fax
legislation enacted by the states is subject to the provisions of the equal protection clause of Amendmrnt XIV,
Constitution of the United States.
States having" uniform" income tax proviRionR ha Ye
usually held that the provisions are substantially coextensive with the uniformity requirement of the equal
protection clause. See, for example, Methodist Book Concern v. r:allon·ay, 186 Ore. 585, 208 P.2d 319.

By its terms H. B. 81 requires Utah taxpayers to
pay income tax based upon a higher rate if their "taxable
year" begins on or after ,January 1, 19GG, and if the:'
filed their returns on or after .January 1, 1!16G. Tax-

14

payers who would not come within this provision would
indmil' fiscal year taxpayers ·whose year began before
J:rnuary 1, 196;); ealendar year taxpayers who filed returns prior to .J auuary 1, 1065; and taxpayers who are
uot 011 an mrnual basis, such as the estates of taxpayers
who died during the year la65, or citizens of Utah who
('hanged their rc•sidcnce and domirile to another state
during 1965.
Although tl18 elassifirations we are talking about
arise out of the ''effective date'' provision of H. B. 81,
they are real classifications and it is necessary to determine their legitimacy under Article I, Section 24, of the
Constitution of Utah and the equal protection clause of
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States.

A number of decisions have held taxing statutes to
he im'alid because the classifications established had no
reas01:able relationship to the objects and purposes of
the legislation. One of the earliest cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court is Pollock v. Farmers Lor1n
,f: Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed.
759, in which an early inrome tax statute was held to be
unconstitutional. Speaking of the statute the court
said:
''The inherent and fundamental nature and character of the tax is that of a rontrihution to the
support of the goYernment, levied upon the principle of equal and uniform apportionment among
the persons taxed, and any other exaction does
not rome within the legal definition of a tax.
"ThiK inhrrent limitation upon the taxing
power forhids the imposition of taxes which are
15

1111eq1rnl in tl1<'i1· opcrnti011 11JH>ll similm· ki11<1s o!
p1·op0rt:,, nnd iie<·ess;.uil:, strikvs <101Y11 the gm:-:,
Hl1l1 ;HhitTal')' ([isti11dio11s in tlw im•omp Jaw (\,;
p;1sse(1 hY eo11gr<'ss. The la1Y, ns we have sern,
<1istingnisl1es in tl10 tnxatio11 lwhn•en corporntion;;
h)' PXl'mpting the pro1H•rt:, of some of them from
taxation and h•\')'ing the tax 011 the p1·opert:· of
oth0rs when tl1e <'orporations <1o not materially
r1iffrr from 01w miotlwr in the ehararter of their
lmsiness or in protedion reqnire<1 h:· tlw gover!lm<•nt. rl1rifli11g differenees in their mo<1es of husi1wss, lm t 11ot ill their resnlts, a re mac10 on th0
gnnrnr 1 a m1 ocea si 011 of the gr ea t0st possihlc
<1iffL•re11c C'S in the amount of taxes ]eYier1 np011
t11eir inrome, sho-wing that the aetion of the JegiRJatiYe r>owrr upon them has lwen arhitrar:' nml
eapririons arnl somdimes mPn•J:, f m1rifnl.''

A more rPee11t n•eoguition of the applirahility of i!ie
l'<jltal

protPdion el;rnse to tnxation l1y the states is forn1rl

in Allied Stores of Ohio, l11c.

S. Ct

4~~7,

1-.

Bo11·rrs, 8;)8 U.S. ;)22,

7~1

;3 L. Ed. 2<1 -1-80, wherein tl1e eonrt, nlthongl1

upholding n

elm·;;;~fiC'ntio11

as reaso1rnhlr, mnf1e tlie fo1ln\\'-

rng statement:
"*: '' ''There is <1 1Jo111t hc•:,orn1 \\'l1ie]1 th0 Stn'!P
ca1111ot g·ri witl1011t ,-iolati1;g- the Eqnnl Pr(J1 udir111
Clause. rr11c· Stnte mnst prnerr(1 npmi a r:1tiow11
hasis a]l(1 ma:- not resort to ;1 clnssif1e~1tirrn tlwl
is palpably ;nhitrnr)-. r1 1 Jw rulr ofte11 ]ms lwf'll
stated to l>C~ that the elnssifiration 'mnst rrst ll]JOll
somr ground of diffrrl'nce bm-ing n fair ;rnc1 s11l1
stantfal relation to the ol>jt>et of the legisfotinn.'
[Citing cases.]"

Deeision s in eon rts of sister st a ks

lHffC

al so recog-

nized the rn•(>(1 for a classifiration hasec1 npon some snl>

In Blaustein v. I)euin, 178 .M<l. 423, 4 A
:2(1 8Gl, :m income tax statute was hel<l invalid because
of <liffore11ces it made in certain trust income. The Court
of Appeals of :'.\faryland said:
sta11ti~1l grom1cl.

"Now, what the legislature bas done hv the Act
of 1935, Ch. 302, is to singlP out the resident beneficiaries of non-resident trusts 'wlwre the donor
or testator creating sueh trust, is or was, at the
time of creation of sue h trust, a resident of this
state,' nncl impose upon such beneficiaries a tax
of six per cent per annum on the income from
such trusts. and it excuses, certainly does not include, other beneficiaries of trusts, such as resident beneficiaries of trusts foreign from their incPption, and resident beneficiaries of wholly local
trusts, though they are all exactly alike. The discrimination is in taxing one group of persons
answering the description of the act of 1935, without including others who are similarly situated.

* * *
"In the opnnon of this court, Section 141 (a)
of the Act of 1935, ch. 302, is invalid, because it
sets up an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between persons of the same general
clases. * * *"
Tn Jfrnry v. 8l1ecinsky, 239 Ala. 293, 195 So. 222, the
Rnpr2mc Court of Alabama struck down a Revenue Act.
While recognizing that taxing statutes are not required
to provide for "perfect equality" there is a requirement
that some individuals of a class fairly arranged arc not
:-:Pl<'dt•d to cany a burden not alike operative on all of
1lu• ebss, and that each local or sub-class must be reason1

lil<· all<l

110t

ca1>ricious in order to he sustained.
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0. Y.

K eiducky

Tu:r Co111missio11 et al., 278 Ky. 367, 128 R.\Y. 2(1 ;)81, the

Court of Amwals of Ke11tucky saw iuvaliclit)· i11 a liC'P11se aml occupation tax. The conrt saicl:
''-W'hilr tlt(' p1·0,·isions of S!'dion 171 of our ('011stit11tio11, n•quiring h1xrs to lw eqnal and uniform,
appl)· in thPir fullness on])· to (lirPct taxation of
l Jrorwrt)·, y0t t lw principa] of Pq nali t_\· and unifo rmi 1y mnst llC' ohsPrn'd in imposing licrnsr and
ocenpatio11 taxrs. Tlw uniformit_\· pnn·isi011 <lop:;
not prrYent the classification of lmsinessrs, tradr~.
profrssions or occnpati011s, arnl tl1r taxation of
diffrrent classes at clifferent rates, but the tax
mnst he nniform on all snh.ircts -within tbe class
to which it is appl)·ing, arnl the classification
mnst he madr according to 1rnturn] and \Yr11 r0cogniZC'(l Jilws of cli stincti 011. Th 0 di ff err11eP npon
"·hich thP cbssification is liascc1 must he snhsta11tia1. * * * The principle of 0qnalit_\· ancl nniformity
in taxation is onP of the corner stonc•s of our eonstitution, and has been zealously guarded by the
decisions d this conrt in applying it, not only to
statutes 10Y)·ing a din•ct tax on property, but to
Rtatutes and municipal ordina11ces imposing occupation taxes."
In OJJi11io11 of' tl1e .!11stices (N. H. Hl65), 208 A. 458,
the Supreme Court of N cw Hampshire recognized limit:-:
upon tlw elassif::in)!: rip;hts of tlw lrg-is1ntnre "·itli r('~ll('ct
to reYenue mrnsnreR mid exprrsRecl an opinion that n rr\'enue rneaRnrr heeanse of improper elassifirations 1n1:-:
im·alid. The eonrt Raid:
"House Bill 2!12 wonlc1 tax the inconws from rwr
sonal sen·iees of all kirnls. inelrnling fll'Of Pssi01i:1 1
sen·ices, <'XCPT>t that it would not i ax i11eom(' fron 1
JS

penmual services of an identical sort 'for which
wages or salaries arc recein~d from an employer'
(,1 V. F'or L'Xample, a s<:•lf-cmployf'd carpenter,
pai11ter, plumber or general repairman would pay
a tax. But bis assistants, rcceivi11g wages or salaries for an identical service, would pay 11othing. * '~ * Such examples can he multiplied almost
indefinitely, hut it appears to us mmec~essary to
do so.
"We have said that a tax imposed on rorporations, while allowing individuals engaged in like
businesses or vocations to go free, is unconstitutional. [Citing cases] The co11verse of this
is also true. [Citing cases] By incorporating his
lmsiness and drawing a salary, any owner of a
business could avoid personal liability for the tax.
The small corporation by disbursing its receipts
and the payments of salaries and other expenses,
could likevv·ise avoid liability for the tax. * * * It
follows that this provision cannot be held constitutional."
In City of Lonisville et al. v. Koelzler r;t al., (Ky.
1D5-l:) 264 S.W. 2d 80, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky

held unconstitutional an ordinance imposing minimum
annual license fops on businesses regardless of the amount
of business done in the city. Noting a provision that none
of th2 minimum fee would he returned, and that tlw law
was a revenue measure designed in part to obtain revenue
from itinerant merchants, the court said:
"Section 9( e) really does not apply to itinerant
merchants as such, hut only to those merC'hants
who srll or do lmsinPss from a fixed location for a
period of h'ss than a year. Tf such a merehant
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were to operate a business for ele,·en months, fo 1
example, and made no profit, he 1rnnk1 he subject
to a license fee of $2:50.00, while a11othcr mrrchant
in the same line of enclraYor who managed to stay
in business for a yrar without making a profit
would owe no tax and not br out-of-pocket for the
license to do lmsi11ess. * * ~· The fact alone that a
merchant is in lrnsinrss for less than a yrar is
not a sound rrason for placing him in a cliffrrent
classification for tax purposes as that occupied hy
his compC'titor who stays in 1rnsiness for more thnn
a year. Th(-, differencre upon which the classification is hased must he substantial and upon a natural and reasonable hasis. ''

In ln re Vanderbilt's Estate, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. K
2d 379, the Court of Appeals of New York discussed the
limits upon the pm,·er of a legislature to classif>r in estate
tax legislation:
"Thr serious question in this case is whether the
tax violates the constitution of the United States.
TJw state bas a broad po\ver of taxation, but in
the exercise of that power it ma>r not provide a
measure for tax which is entirel>r arhitrary and
which produces inequality and injustice so great as
to cleprin' a taxpayer of thr eq1rnl protection of
the law. * * * Always tJwre mnst he some reason hased on facts, not fiction, for imnosing n
particular tax upon a particular class, and absence
of an>r hasis for the classification may not he
hid<len hy an arbitrm7 creation or a conclnsiYr
presumption. * * *
'' Co1rnidrring the -..,ra]idifr of the tax three factors
must he con~tantly kept' in mind: thr nature of
the tax, the measure of the fax, and its incidence. * * ~''
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In Barker Bros., 111c. v. City of Los .A.ngeles, 10 Cal.
2d GO,j, 7() P. 2d 97, the Supreme Court of California held
iuntlid a general occnpati.011al license tax imposeLl by
1hc City of Los Angeles, on the ground that the classifirations in the statute were arbitrary. The classifications
related to differences between stores "commonly known
as department stores'' and other stores. The Supreme
Court of California said:

''\Viele disrretion is g-iven to legislatin' bodies in
the imposition of taxes, and the right to classify
for such purposes is of wide range and flexibility.
* '~ * 'The equal protection clause does not detract from the right of the state justly to exert its
taxing power or prevent it from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that connection "but it does require
that the classification be not arbitrary, but based
on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation." [Citing Power Co. v. Saunders, 27 4
U. S. 490, 493, 47 Sup. Ct. 678, 71 L. Ed. 17165,
and other cases.]
"While the state may classify broadly the subjects of taxation, it must do so on a rational h(lsis
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
he treated alike.''
For authorities holding generally that income tax
statutes may not discriminate in favor of one as against
another in the same position or class, see Cook v. Walter
Dry Goods Co., 212 Ark. 485, 206 S.W. 2d 742; Hartman v.
Sfate Commission of Rerenue and Taxation, 164 Kan. 62,
187 P. 2d 939; Martin v. Cage, (Ky.) 134 S.W. 2d 966;
r'71 ri-"fo7Jhrr v. J r1111 in gs, 122 vV. Va. 665, 12 S.E. 2d 813;
21

Ap1J1'al of r ( / ) / IJ.IJke, 217 \Yi:-; ..-f28, ~.)~l l\'.\Y. 700, 9S
..:\.L.H. I:l:32; 1 C'noley on Ta.rntirm ( 4tlt J1~cl. 228.

Tn S'taf(' <'X rel llall'ort/1 ,-. Bernt.-.·e11, ()8 Tela. G39.
200 P. 2tl 1007, the Supreme Court of Idaho struck clown
an income tax statutt> giving residents a ereclit of $1,GOO
against net income in ease of a husband and wifo, together with $200 for each dependent, lmt g-iving no11resicle11t::-: a credit of only $700, as violating the privileges
and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution. It
would also seem to be in viola ti on of the erprnl protection
claus8.
In light of the tests set out abon~, the provisions of
H.B. -81 arc unconstitutional and void (under Utah mid
U. S. Constitutions) insofar as they discriminate lwbYeen "slow" calendar year taxpayers on the one hand,
and fiscal year taxpayers, non-annual taxpayers, arnl
"fast" calendar year taxpayers on the other. Iii its
brief the appellant Tax Commission argues that there is a
legitimate reason for making a distinction between fiscal
year taxpayers and calendar year taxpayers. It is difficult to see any basis for the distinction.
Payment upon a fiscal year, while authorized hy
statute. is not prescribed by it. Whether a taxpayer file~
upon a fiscal or calendar year basis is pretty much lc·ft
up to the desires and accounting methods of the taxpayl'r
and the approval or agreement of the Tax Commission.
It is provided hy 59-14-12 Utah Code Annotated HJ:'i:l
that net income shall be eompnted upon the hasis A
00

1l1c t:l'l:}J<l,\'('l''s annual ac<·om1ti11g perio<L

But 5!l-14:-1-±
('outernplates that a taxpayer may change his aecou11ti11g
period. 1Tnder t11e pro,·isiom; of .)9-14-13 lTtah Code "\1111otatcd 19;):3, if a taxpayer \Yith the approval of the rrnx
( 'ommission <'hm1ges the basis of eomputiug net i1wome
from a ealernlar )·rar to a fiscal year, a separate' return
is to he made for the period between the elose of the
last C'Hl<>ll<lnr )·e;1r for whieh t11e return was made arnl
tlH• elate> desiguatrd as the elost• of the fiseal year. Cont·ri,·alily, some taxpayers eoulcl still bring themselves
under the old tax rate hy obtaining approval from the
'l'ax Commi8sion to eha11ge from a ealernlar year basis
to a fiseal year basis for the year 1965.
Tm1Rmuch a8 income tax statutes arc related pr1mmil)· to the raising of r<>venue and standing the costs
of government, there is no significant relationship behYPe11 the dassifications established by H. B. -81. Fiscal
:'ear taxpayers, the only clifferenee hetween whom and
calendar year taxpayers is that they lrnvc a different
a<'eom1ti11g period, ought to hear the same burden of
lax inrrease as calendar year taxpayers; persons who remove from the state, or estates whose predecessor taxpa~'ers died during the calendar year, should not be permitted to avoid the tax by such a happenstance. By its
plain terms the statute permits some henefits to those
laxpnyers who are able to race to the Tax Commission
with returns for the calendar year 1965.

It is submitted that the classifications arc arbihan. '
and cannot he justified hy the argumt>nt that the legi~
lature ought not to have to bother \Yith snch deblil.
CONCLUSIO)J
r:ro achieve the results contended for hv
. the State Tax.
Commission would require this court to go into the legislative lmsiness itself and either excise significant proYisions from H. B. -81 or write other provisions into it.
Time and again this court has held, consistent with views
almost uniYersally recognized, that it may not find that
because of the "intention" of the legislature a statute
should be held to have some meaning that it clearl~·
doesn't have.
Section 5 of H. B. 81 which presently reads:
"The tax rates pnwidrd for herein shall apply to
all tax returns filed on or after J mrnary 1, 1966,
for taxable >"ears commencing 011 or after .Tmnrnn
1, 1965. ,,
Should, says the Tax Commission, he re-written to rend
as follows:
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to
all taxable years commencing on or after .January 1, 196:).''
Not only should this court refuse to enter the field of
legislative draftsmanship, but it should declare invalid
any act of the legislature \vhich contravenes the constitutional provisions requiring uniformit>" of legislatioll.
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Hrgtrnlless of the interpretation given by the court to the
rights of early filers, H. B. 81 is discriminatory with
respect to a large group of taxpayers in that it has made
thr question of liability for the increased rates depend
npon a circumstance which has nothing to do with the
Jrg·itimnte puroses of the revenue legislation. vVe submit that the portion of the trial court's judgment construing the meaning of H. B. 81 should be affirmed and
that the entire act should be declared unconstitutional
and void because of its lack of uniform application and
its denial of equal protection of the laws.
Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN E. MECHAM
FRANK V. NELSON
LORIN N. PACE
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Respondents and
Cross Appellants.
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